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INCENTIVE PROGRAMS BY MERCHANT-SELLERS IN WHICH CASH AND 
PRIZES ARE PAID TO BUYERS' AGENTS: TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD 
THEY BE PERMITTED UNDER SECTION 2(c) OF THE ROBINSON-PATMAN 
ACT? 
by 
William E. Greenspan* 
Imagine a situation whereby American Appliance Company 
is a large retail dealer selling most major brands of 
appliances, including washers, dryers, ranges, microwaves, 
dishwashers, refrigerators and freezers. National 
Corporation an appliance manufacturer, sells appliances to 
American. 'on one occasion National offers an "incentive" 
program to American's salespeople. Under the terms of the 
program, an American salesperson will receive twenty dollars 
for each National appliance the salesperson sells during the 
month of January. Payments are mailed by National to the 
salespersons at their home address. Naturally, any customer 
entering American's spectacular showroom during 
looking for an appliance, will be greeted by an Amer2can 
salesperson who eagerly points out . the advantages of 
National appliances over other major brands. Some of these 
customers, relying on the salesperson's recommendation, 
will buy a National appliance never knowing the salesperson 
was partially motivated by the incentive plan. 
Many neutral observers, looking at this incentive plan, 
may think it is unethical, while others may approve of it as 
a widely acceptable way of doing business. Some may 
such incentive plans should be illegal. This paper exam2nes 
to what extent it is wise and feasible to regulate such 
incentive plans under section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman 
Act: Payment acceptance of commission, brokerage or other 
compensation. 
More specifically this paper will discuss (1) a 
Robinson-Patman Act overview, 2 (2) F.T.C. v. Henry Broch & 
the only United States Supreme Court case 
rev2ew2ng section 2(c), (3) recent lower court 
interpretations of section 2(c), (4) Metrix v. Daimler-Benz 
Aktiengesellschaft,4 a " case in point" on incentive 
programs similar to the American Appliance example stated 
above, and (5) conclusions and recommendations. 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Bridgeport, 
Bridgeport, CT. 
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A ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT OVERVIEW 
In 1936 Congress amended section 2 of the Clayton Act 
and enacted the Robinson-Patman Act5 which deals with 
illegal price discrimination. Sections 2(a) and 2(b) are 
the heart of the Act, addressing the primary purpose for 
which it was passed: 
The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act 
makes it abundantly clear that Congress considered it 
to be an evil that a large buyer could secure a 
competitive advantage over a small buyer solely because 
of _the large buyer's quantity purchasing ability. The 
Rob2nson-Patman Act was passed to deprive a large buyer 
of such advantages except to the extent that a lower 
price could be justified by reason of a seller's 
diminished costs due to quantity manufacture, delivery 
or sale, or by reason of the seller's good faith effort 
to meet a competitor's equally low price.6 
Section 2(a) prohibits a discrimination in price 
between purchasers of commodities of like grade 
and qual2ty, where the effect of such discrimination may be 
competition. However a seller may 
grant a pr2ce d2fferent2al which reflects reduced costs due 
to quantity manufacture, delivery or sale.7 
.Bection 2(b) provides another defense to section 2(a) 
the "meeting not beating" defense. In order to prevail on 
section 2(b) "meeting not beating" defense, an accused 
seller must show that he lowered his price in good faith to 
meet, but not beat, that of a competitor of the 
Sections 2(d) and 2(e) are companion sections. A 
seller is prohibited from making cash payments [2(d)] to a 
for promoting the product, or furnishing 
serv2ces or [2(e)J (advertising, catalogs, 
demonstrators, d2splay materials, special packaging) to a 
customer for promoting the seller's product unless such 
payments, services or facilities are made available to all 
competing customers on proportionally equal terms.9 
The difference between the two subsections is that in 
subsection (d) the customer supplies the services or 
facilities and his vendor pays the bill and in 
subsection (e) the wholesale vendor himself supplies 
the services and facilities for the use of his customer 
in facilitating resales.lO 
Section 2(f) is the "flip side" of section 2(a). It 
a buyer from knowingly inducing or receiving a 
d2scrimination in price prohibited by section 2(a).ll Even 
though the purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act was to prevent 
large buyers from using their economic advantage to secure a 
discrimination in price, section 2(a) makes no mention of 
any restraint on buyers. Instead it only prevents sellers 
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from engaging in price discrimination. Therefore, although 
a buyer could not be held liable under section.2(a) for 
price discrimination, such could b7 held for 
violating section 2(f) fQr hav1ng know1ngly 1nduced a 
violation of section 2(a).l2 
Section 2(c), with which this paper is concerned, 
prohibits a party from paying or receiving a 
brokerage or discount in lieu thereof, except fol
3
serv1ces 
rendered 'to or from the other party or his agent. Stated 
section 2(c) prohibits a seller from paying a 
to a buyer or his agent in connection with the 
sale of goods, unless actual services are p7rformed 
connection with the sale. Likewise a buyer or h1s agent 1s 
prohibited from receiving a commission from the in 
connection with the sale of goods, unless actual serv1ces 
are performed in connection with the sale. Section 2(c) is 
a "per se" violation. None of the enumerated defenses in 
sections 2(a) and 2(b) (no lessening of competition, cost 
justification, "meeting not beating") are available when one 
is charged with a violation of section 2(c). The only 
possible defense, the "for services rendered" proviso, has 
been narrowly interpreted and rarely allowed as a defense. 
Early interpretations of the "for services rendered" defense 
indicate that it was only included to make sure that a 
"bona-fide independent" broker would not be denied 
compensation: 
The agent cannot serve two masters, simultaneously 
rendering services in an arm's length transaction to 
both. While the phrase, "for services rendered," does 
not prohibit payment by the seller to his broker for 
bona fide brokerage services, it requires that such 
service be rendered by the broker to the person who has 
engaged him. In short, a selling function 
cannot be combined in one person. 
In 1960 the United States Supreme Court reviewed the 
legislative history of section 2(c) in F.T.C. v. Henry 
Broch & Com)any,l? and gave examples of the type of conduct 
section 2(c was intended to prohibit. This was the first 
and only section 2(c) case to reach the Court. 
F.T.C. v. HENRY BROCH & COMPANY 
Broch was a broker or sales representative for 
approximately 25 sellers of food products, including Canada 
Foods, a processor of apple concentrate and other products. 
Canada Foods set its price for apple concentrate at $1.30 
per gallon in 50-gallon steel drums, including a five per 
cent commission for Broch. J.M. Smucker Co., a large buyer 
of apple concentrate for use in its manufacture of apple 
butter and preserves, offered to purchase 500 steel drums of 
apple concentrate at $1.25 per gallon. Aft7r some 
negotiations, a sale was arranged at $1.25, w1th the 
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condition that Broch reduce its commission from five per 
cent to three per cent to absorb half of the price 
reduction. The reduced price of $1.25 was granted to 
Smucker on subsequent sales, while sales to all other 
customers continued to be $1.30 with Broch earning his usual 
five per cent commission.l6 
The Federal Trade Commission found the price reduction 
to Smucker was a disQount in lieu of of brokerage in 
Vlolatlon of section 2(c).lf The Seventh Circuit reversed 
holding _that "[n]either the language of § 2(c) nor 
legislat1ve history8 indicates that a seller's broker is covered by§ 2(c)."l 
. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari t 
2(c) is applicable to this 
Rev1ew1ng the leg1slative history of the Robinson-Patman 
Act, the Court stated: 
The Robinson-Patman Act was enacted in 1936 to curb and 
prohibit all devices by which large buyers gained 
preferences over smaller ones by virtue 
th71r greater purchasing power .... Congress in 
1ts Wlsdom phrased § 2(c) broadly, not only to cover 
the methods then in existence but all other means 
by Whlch brokerage could be used to effect price discrimination.20 
The Court further noted which parties may be 
as "any person" in section 2(c): 
The particular evil at which § 2(c) is aimed can be as 
easily perpetrated by a seller's broker as by the 
seller himself . The seller's broker is clearly 
"any person" as the words are used in § 2(c) - as 
clearly such as a buyer's broker.21 
Thus the Court supported the position of the Federal Trade Commission: 
We conclude that the statute clearly applies to 
payments or allowances by a seller's broker to the 
buyer, whether made directly to the buyer, or 
indirectly, through the seller. The allowances 
proscribed by § 2(c) are those made by "any person" 
which, 2a2 s we have said, clearly encompasses a seller's broker. 
Although there are numerous ways one may abuse the 
function to effect a price discrimination in 
violat1on .of 2(c), one instructive aspect of Broch 
1t ident1f1es three situations which are clearly 
v1olat1ons of section 2(c). The first situation describes 
setting up "dummy" brokers: 
One of the favorite means of obtaining an indirect 
price concession was by setting up "dummy" brokers who 
were employed by the buyer and who, in many cases, 
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rendered no services. The large buyers demanded that 
the seller pay "brokerage" to these fictitious 
who then turned it over to their employer. Thls 
practice was one of the chief targets of § 2(c) of the 
Act.23 
In a second situation, a large buyer seeks to evade 
section 2(c) by accepting price reductions equivalent to the 
seller's normal brokerage payments. The buyer negotiates 
directly with the seller, instead of through.the 
broker. The buyer insists on and receives a pr2ce reductlon 
from the seller equal to the amount of the brokerage or 
commission the seller would have normally paid to the 
broker. This is "an allowance in lieu of brokerage under 
§ 2(c) and [is] prohibited even though, in fact, the seller 
had 'saved' his expense by dealing directly with 
the selected buyer." 
The third situation is Brach. A large buyer (Smucker) 
asks for a price reduction from the seller (Canada Foods). 
The seller normally sells through a broker (Brach). The 
seller telephones the broker and advises the broker that 
the seller will make the sale at the reduced price if the 
broker agrees to yield part of his brokerage fee for sales 
with that buyer only. The broker agrees, and the sale takes 
place. This violates section 2(c). 
Congress enacted the Robinson-Patman Act to prevent 
sellers and sellers' brokers from yielding to the 
economic pressures of a large buying organization by 
granting unfair preferences in connection with the sale 
of the goods. The form in which the buyer pressure is 
exerted is immaterial . . . . There is no difference in 
economic effect between the seller's broker splitting 
his brokerage commission with the buyer and his 
yielding part of the brokerage to the seller to
2
ge 
passed on to the buyer in the form of a lower price. 
In summary, the Court made it clear that section 2(c) 
is a "per se" statute, absolute in its terms. None of the 
defenses in section 2(a) (no lessening of competition, cost 
justification, "meeting not beating") are available when one 
is charged with a section 2(c) violation. In the 
"services rendered" exception appeared to be llmlted to 
situations involving payments by a seller or buyer to his 
own broker, and that neither party to a transaction nor his 








in dictum, the Court made one troubling 
no evidence [in this case] that [Smucker] 
any services to [Canada Foods] nor that 
in [Smucker's] method of dealing justified its 









brokerage charge. We would h.av.e.qu.ite a different case 
if there were such evidence 26 
Does this mean there might be some situation 
whereby the "services rendered" exception would be used to 
allow a limited cost justification defense when the seller 
shows a savings in distribution costs because of a 
method of dealing? Would it make any 
lf allowances in brokerage were · made on a 
basis? Brach left these questions 
unanswered, rlsklng inconsistent applications of Brach in 
future court decisions. -----
RECENT LOWER COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 2(c) ISSUES 
Predictably, recent court opinions dealing with section 
2(c) discussed whether Brach dictum "opened the door" 
defenses when one is charged with a section 2(c) 
Vlolatlon. The results have been inconsistent. 
In Federal Paper Bd. Co., Inc. v. Amata,27 Federal sold 
wood and paper products, including recycled paperboard and 
paperboard cartons made from wastepaper. Federal routinely 
bought wastepaper from several wastepaper suppliers. Amata, 
who worked for Federal, was responsible for purchasing 
wastepaper from these competing suppliers at the most 
advantageous price and delivery terms. Amata demanded and 
accepted bribes and kickbacks from these suppliers with the 
result that the majority of Federal's wastepaper came from 
suppliers making payments to Amata. The cost of the bribes 
passed on to Federal in the sales price. When Federal 
dlscovered Amata's conduct, Federal fired Amata. Federal 
was then able to8purchase wastepaper from several suppliers at lower prices.2 
Federal sued Amata and the bribe-paying suppliers 
claiming, among other things, a violation of section 2(c) of 
the Act. alleged "that the payments 
recelved by Amata were not for bona fide services rendered 
but were commercial bribes." 29 In defense, the 
Federal to allege anticompetitive injury, 
Whlch ls a prerequ2s2te for a section 2(c) violation.30 
The court held that the facts of this case were covered 
by section 2(c), and that anticompetitive injury is not a 
prerequisite for a section 2(c) violation. 
Payments were made to Amata, an agent of the buyer 
that were not for services rendered. To 
to make additional allegations of 
antlcompetitlve effect in order to establish a prima 
facie violation of section 2(c) would be to impose a 
common law limitation on the broad language enacted by 
Congress. At least a few courts appear to have held 
that in order for payments to constitute a violation of 
152 
section 2(c) the payments must have an anticompetitive 
effect This court finds, however, that 
long-standing Second Circuit precedent and Supreme 
Court dicta refute any claim that anticompetitive 
injury is an element of a violation of section 2(c) of 
the Robinson-Patman Act.31 
In Seaboard Supply Co. v. Congoleum,32 Congoleum 
Corporation, a felt manufacturer, sold products to Seaboard 
and others who engaged in the wholesale distribution of 
roofing felt. Jack Berk, a sales manager for Congoleum, 
recommended to Congoleum that Manufacturers Reps Company 
(MRC) become a commissioned sales agent for Congoleum. 
Congoleum agreed. Unknown to Congoleum, Berk and MRC had a 
secret arrangement whereby MRC paid bribes (consulting 
services) to Berk. Since Berk had the ability to cause 
orders to be cancelled or delayed and could steer customers 
to another distributor or agent, Seaboard lost 
customers who transferred their business to MRC. When 
Congoleum's management found out about Berk's conduct, it 
discharged Berk. Meanwhile, Seaboard sued Congoleum, Berk 
and MRC alleging, among other things, a violation of section 
2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act.33 
The district court recognized that section 2(c) 
"prohibits unearned payments to the other party to a 
transaction or to an agent who is subject to the control of 
a person other than the one making the payment." 
Considering the statute, case precedents and legislative 
history, the district court concluded that section 2(c) 
"applies only to unlawful payments which pass between 
sellers and purchasers." In this case MRC was not a 
purchaser from Congoleum; instead MRC was an agent of 
Congoleum. Therefore the payments made from MRC to Berk did 
not violate section 
The court of appeals agreed with the district court, 
noting concern "whether Congress intended to swee
3
g 
commercial bribery within the ambit of section 2(c)."? 
While the court recognized that at least three circuits 
(6th Cir., 7th Cir., 9th Cir.) held commercial bribery 
came within the terms of section 2(c), and that these 
decisions have been generally accepted and supported by the 
statutory language, the court was not convinced the scope of 
2(c) covers the conduct here. 
In the appellate decisions which have found commercial 
bribery within the ambit of section 2(c) the common 
thread has been the passing of illegal payments from 
seller to buyer or vice versa. Adherence to the 
requirement that payments cross this seller-buyer line 
is consistent with the interpretation of 2(c) in 
nonbribery cases .... Here, that line has not been 
crossed. a sales agent of the seller Congoleum, 
bribed Berk, the seller's employee. MRC was not a 
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purchaser, and consequently, the statutory requisites 
have not been met.3b 
In Gregoris Motors v. Nissan Motor Corp. in USA 37 
Gregoris is a Datsun dealership, while Nissan is the 
American branch of the Japanese manufacturer of Datsun 
vehicles. Richard Hungerford is Nissan's Regional Sales 
Manager. Gregoris alleges, among other things a violation 
of section 2(c) when Hungerford sought and bribes 
from Datsun dealers competing with Gregoris. Any dealer 
paying bribes would receive a favorable allocation of cars 
receiving early delivery and desirable models: 
S1nce Gregoris did not give bribes, its allocations of new 
cars was substantially to the point of threatening 





the defenses raised by Hungerford and the 
dealers was that there can be no violation of 
without anticompetitive injury. The district 
While several courts have required anticompetitive 
injury for a section 2(c) claim ... this Court is 
persuaded that anticompetitive injury is not necessary 
for maintaining a claim under § 2(c) .... Such a 
requirement is unduly restrictiye and is not part of 
the plain language of the 
. 
Another defense was that the "plaintiff must have 
suffered the injury of price discrimination as a result of 
bribery." The district court rejected this defense. 
Although the Robinson-Patman Act is directed mainly at 
price discrimination, § 2(c) does not specifically 
mention price discrimination as the forbidden goal of 
the bribery. Increasingly the case law supports the 
conclusion that a violation of § 2(c) can be based on 
indirect price discrimination. In fact business 
practices other than price discrimination give rise 
to a § 2(c) 
It is interesting to note that although the court in 
Seaboard expressed doubts whether Congress intended to sweep 
commercial bribery within the ambit of section 2(c), 
Gregoris expressly declared that section 2(c) "forbids 
commercial bribery in connection with the sale or purchase 
of goods or 
In Stephen Jay Photography. Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc.,42 
Stephen Jay and Olan Mills are competing commercial 
in the Norfolk, Virginia, area. Through 
competitive negotiation Olan Mills and one other commercial 
photographer contracted with all 22 high schools in the 
Norfolk area whereby Olan would be the official photographer 
for high school yearbook pictures. It was also agreed that 
Olan would pay the schools a percentage of the profits 
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earned from sales of optional portrait photographs of 
students. Letters to the students disclosed that Olan was 
the official photographer and that part of the optional 
portrait photograph price would be given to the school to 
support various school activities. Although students were 
not obligated to use the official this 
marketing plan of coordinating the yearbook plctures and 
portraits, coupled with the endorsement the school, gave 
Olan a competitive advantage over competlng photographers, 
such as Stephen Jay, in selling portraits. Stephen Jay 
Olan claiming, among other things, that_Olan engaged ln 
commercial bribery in violation of sectlon 2(c) of the 
Robinson-Patman Act.43 
One of the defenses raised by Olan was that commercial 
bribery does not constitute a violation of section 2(c) . 
The court indicated that this circuit (4th Cir.) had not yet 
addressed the issue. Nevertheless four 
7th 9th) have applied a commercial brlbery analysls ln 
section 2(c) cases.4 4 Also the legislative 
section 2(c), as stated in Broch, 
that Congress intended to commerclal brlbery Wlthln 
the ambit of section 2(c). ? Therefore the court 
without deciding, that section 2(c) proscribes commerclal 
bribery. 
Another defense raised by Olan was that the schools 
were not "agents . . acting in fact for . . . any party to 
such transaction." The court recognized that commercial 
bribery cases must involve the corruption of an agency 
relationship. Any alleged bribes must cross the 
seller-buyer line. In this case, according to the court, 
there was no agency relationship between the schools and the 
students because "the schools did not have authority to bind 
the students to purchase portraits. Instead the students 
were free to purchase portraits from [Olan] or a 
photographer of their choice, or to purchase no portralts 
from anyone." 
Therefore, even assuming section 2(c) proscribes 
commercial bribery, we conclude that no violation 
occurred here. Unquestionably, the schools and 
students enjoy a special relationship of trust. And lt 
is true that the schools arranged to have yearbook 
photographs taken by [Olan] and encouraged students to 
purchase portraits from them. However, letters 
encouraging the students to . these 
photographs . . . indicated that thelr declslon 
purchase portraits was optional. From thls 
correspondence it is abundantly clear that the 
did not assume a position that of a portralt 
purchasing agent for the students. 
Another 
relationship 
recent case questioning whether an agency 
existed is Harris v . Duty Free Shoppers Ltd. 
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Partnership. 47 Harris and Duty Free Shoppers operate 
competing duty free stores in downtown San Francisco, 
catering especially to Japanese tourists. Duty Free paid 
lump sum amounts and commissions to tour companies and to 
tour guides to promote Duty Free's downtown shop by 
scheduling stops of tour buses at the store. The tourists 
are not required to buy from Duty Free. They can and do 
purchase goods from other stores The tourists do not know 
that is making these payments. Apparently, 
hotels, alrllnes, and other businesses make similar payments 
to travel companies. Harris, who does not make payments 
sued. Duty Free claiming, among other things, a violation of 
sectlon 2(:) of the Robinson-Patman Act. More specifically 
Harris clalmed that the tour guides owe a fiduciary duty to 
the tourists, and that duty was breached by accepting payments from Duty Free.48 
The court held that the "tour guides and tour operators 
are not in an agency or fiduciary relationship with their 
passengers, nor do they serve as intermediaries 'subject to 
the direct or indirect control' of those passengers with 
regard to the transactions in question - the of 
Duty Free's retail goods." The reasons given by the court 
were there was no employment relationship between the 
tour guldes and the tourists, the tour guides were not II t II 
exper s on whose advice the tourists relied the tour 
were not "at all times subject to the of the 
tourlsts, and the tourists were free to purchase their 
souvenirs anywhere, or, in fact, not at all. Therefore 
there was no violation of section 2(c).49 
The court underscored the issue by stating it made no 
difference "whether the tour guides' services were available 
to competitors of Duty Free on like terms or 
conditions, . . . whether the value of the tour guides 
services correspond to the payments, and whether the 
payments were secret." The crucial issue here was "whether 
the tour guides are of the tourists such that they 
owe a fiduciary duty." Since there was no fiduciary duty 
between the tour guides and the tourists, there could be no 
violation of section 2(c). 
Although these recent lower court interpretations of 
section 2(c) are sometimes inconsistent with each other the 
following principles can be gleaned: ' 
(1) Section 2(c) is a "per se" violation. 
(2) The "for services rendered" defense in section 2(c) is 
very narrowly applied. It has only been included to 
make sure a "bona fide" independent broker will not be 







Although some courts question whether anticompetitive 
injury is a necessary element for a section 2(c) 
violation there is strong support in section 2(c), its 
history, Broch, and court that 
anticompetitive injury is not a prerequlslte for a 
section 2(c) violation. 
Section 2(c) applies only to unlawful payments (or 
other discriminatory business practices) that pass 
between sellers and purchasers. There must be 
corruption of an agency relationship. 
Several federal court decisions indicate that Congress 
intended to sweep commercial bribery cases within the 












other than price 
a section 2(c) 
It is irrelevant in defense of a section 2(c) charge 
whether alleged illegal payments are equally available 
to all purchasers, whether payments correspond to the 
value of services rendered, or whether payments were 
secret. 
Having reviewed the provisions of 
Act, especially section 2(c); the declslon, 
its discussion of the legislative hlstory of sectlon 2(c), 
and recent lower court opinions interpreting section 2(c); 
the question still remains to what extent in?entive 
by merchant-sellers, in which cash and prlzes are pald to 
buyers' agents should be permitted under section 2(c) of 
the Act. A "case in point" (similar to the 
American Appliance example introducing51this paper) is Metrix v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft. 
METRIX v. DAIMLER-BENZ AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
Metrix Warehouse, Inc. (Metrix) and Mercedes-Benz of 
North America (MBNA) are competitors in the sale of 
automobile parts to approximately 400 Mercedes-Benz dealers 
in the United States. Metrix has an incentive program 
whereby it makes payments to parts managers of Mercedes-Benz 
dealerships based on the number of Metrix products purchased 
by the parts managers' employers. 
More specifically the incentive program involves the 
awarding of points redeemable for either cash or merchandise 
or the payment of cash directly to the parts managers of the 
Mercedes-Benz dealers. These payments are based on a 
percentage of total parts purchased from Metrix. As 
consideration for the payments, the parts managers perform 
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no services other than placing their employers purchase 
orders with Metrix. 
During a six-year period, Metrix paid at least $119,980 
in cash and $394,551 in cash and/or merchandise to parts 
managers of Mercedes-Benz dealers for the placement of 
approximately $13,000,000 in spare parts orders with Metrix. 
Payments are mailed monthly by Metrix to the parts managers 
at their home address. The value of the points is 
approximately percent of the purchase price.52 
When Metrix was charged with a violation of 
section 2(c), Metrix argued there could be no violation 
since the incentive program increased, rather than 
decreased, competition. Therefore there was no adverse 
effect on competition. The district court agreed with 
Metrix finding "that questions of fact remain whether the 
incentive program decreases competition." Stated otherwise, 
the district court agreed with Metrix that a finding of an 
adverse effect on competit1Qn is necessary for there to be a 
violation of section 2(c).?5 
The court of appeals 
2(c) is a "per se" 
violated section 2(c). 
reversed, holding that section 
violation, and that Metrix 
Nothing in the language of section 2(c) ... requires 
proof of an adverse effect on competition before a 
violation may be found where there is an admitted 
payment of a commission or other compensation to an 
agent of the purchaser . Any change in the law 
to address the competitive effect of such compensation 
must be made by Congress .... ? 
Using the language of section 2(c), Metrix is "any 
person" who "pay(s) . . anything of value as ... 
compensation" to "an agent" (parts managers) of the "other 
party" (Mercedes-Benz dealers), where such agent (parts 
managers) is "subject to the direct control" of any party 
(Mercedes-Benz dealers) "other than the person (Metrix) by 
whom such compensation is paid.n55 
Comparing Metrix to the American Appliance example 
introducing this paper, there appears to be no difference 
between the two. Both are "per se" violations of section 
2(c). National is "any person" who "pay(s) ... anything 
of value as ... compensation" to "an agent" (American's 
salespeople) of the "other party" (American), where such 
agent (American's salespeople) is "subject to the direct 
control" of any party (American) "other than the person 
(National) by whom such compensation is paid." 
To what extent it wise and feasible to regulate such 
incentive plans under section 2(c)? 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Incentive programs by merchant-sellers in which cash 
and prizes are paid to buyers' agents should be strictly 
prohibited under section 2(c) . It is well settled that 
section 2(c) is a "per se" violation. The weight of 
authority is that anticompetitive injury is not a 
prerequisite for a section 2(c) violation. It is irrelevant 
whether payments correspond to the value of services 
rendered or whether the payments were secret. Section 2(c) 
covers commercial bribery. As long as there is corruption 
of an agency relationship (i.e. the payments pass between 
sellers and buyers) the conduct should be subject to 
scrutiny under section 2(c). 
The purpose of section 2(c) is to cover all means 
by which brokerage could be used to price 
discrimination. Since there is always the problem of 
antitrust when an individual alleges a section 2(c) 
violation,? the Federal Trade Commission should take 
responsibility for vigorous enforcement of section 2(c). 
Any dissatisfaction with the anticompetitive effects of 2(c) 
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BARGAINING WITH STAKEHOLDERS: 
CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT AND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH 
by 
Julianne Nelson* 
Corporate codes of conduct or ethics have become increasingly 
popular in recent years. Of the 264 companies responding to 
a recent Conference Board survey, more than 75% had some form 
of ethics code; almost half of the firms with codes in place 
had adopted them since 1987. 1 Nor is the adoption of codes 
merely a recent phenomenon: a 1980 study by White and 
Montgomery found that almost 100% of the largest US 
corporations had codes in place. 2 
When, if ever, would a self-interested shareholder support a 
corporate code of conduct? Do such codes ever increase 
shareholder wealth? If one relies on instincts honed by the 
study of competitive markets, one is likely to assume that 
benefits for customers, suppliers, employees and the local 
community necessarily come at the expense of corporate 
shareholders. The very structure of the much-publicized 
Johnson and Johnson (J&J) Credo (reprinted in the Appendix) 
appears to support this hypothesis. When detailing corporate 
responsibilities, the Credo mentions the interests of 
corporate shareholders last, only after it enumerates the 
duties owed to a variety of other stakeholders. In effect, 
the J&J Credo seems to implement a plural purpose view of the 
firm that asks managers to serve a number of constituencies. 
It remains to be seen whether or not this approach could also 
benefit a strictly self-interested shareholder. 
Recent results from applied bargaining theory suggest that the 
J&J Credo may actually increase shareholder wealth in some 
circumstances. Institutional theorists have recently turned 
to "cooperative" solution concepts to determine the efficiency 
implications of different corporate ownership structures. In 
general, research in this area starts from the assumption that 
* Assistant Professor, Economics Area, Stern School of 
Business, New York University, 44 West 4th Street, New York, 
NY 10003. I would like to thank Robert Lindsay for his most 
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